An Analysis of Market Structure and Competitive Conduct of Food Delivery Businesses in Thailand: Empirical Evidence Synthesis and Strategic Implications

Abstract

This article analyzes the market structure and competitive conduct of food delivery platform businesses in Thailand during the post-COVID-19 period, employing the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm of Bain (1956), integrated with the two-sided market theory of Rochet and Tirole (2003) and platform economics. The analysis seeks to understand the transitional dynamics of a market that once grew explosively by 179 percent in 2020 before entering a plateau phase with an estimated value of 86 billion baht in 2023. Findings from a systematic literature review and evidence synthesis drawn from financial institution reports, government agencies, and relevant academic works indicate that the market has evolved into a tight oligopoly, with Grab and LINE MAN Wongnai collectively holding nearly two-thirds of total market share, while other players such as Foodpanda and Robinhood have gradually exited due to accumulated losses under a prolonged subsidy war. In terms of competitive conduct, platforms have shifted from quantity-based market share competition through cross-subsidization toward quality-based competition, emphasizing the construction of Super App ecosystems, the use of lock-in mechanisms via membership and loyalty programs, and investment in platform innovation to enhance platform stickiness. The findings reveal a trade-off between matching efficiency and the fairness of benefit allocation among consumers, restaurants, and riders. The article offers strategic recommendations for operators regarding sales channel diversification, and policy recommendations for regulatory agencies concerning the development of frameworks on commission transparency, standard contracts, and platform labor protection within the contemporary Thai digital economy.